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Abstract 
In the United States, the vast majority of states with multiple congressional districts give 
state legislatures the power to redraw their boundaries following the census every ten years. 
However, since the early days of American history, politicians have manipulated district 
boundaries to benefit themselves and their parties. Gerrymandering continues to plague the 
American electoral system to this day, but most states still use a redistricting method open to 
manipulation. The goal of this paper is to study one state, Michigan, that passed a ballot measure 
in 2018 to change the system. Michigan has since replaced the state legislature with a 
nonpartisan commission to handle the redistricting process. Ultimately, I intend to reveal what 
factored into Michiganders’ opinions when deciding how to vote on this ballot measure. I 
hypothesize that partisan cues, electoral self-interest, and populist ideals will all play a role in 
people’s opinions. Precinct data analyses from both within the 2018 election and across multiple 
cycles, including regressions, revealed that while partisan cues did play a strong role (although 
more so for Democrats than Republicans), electoral self-interest and populist ideals played a 




Redistricting reform seems to be getting an increased amount of publicity as of late. Interest 
groups and citizens alike have protested the unjust nature of partisan gerrymandering and have 
demanded reform. In some states, such as Michigan, such efforts have yielded ballot initiatives 
like Proposition 2, which passed in 2018 (“Michigan Proposal 2”). Its passage took control of the 
redistricting process out of the hands of state legislatures and gave that power to a nonpartisan 
commission. However, despite the ability of such campaigns to point out the flaws of the current 
system, many states still give state legislatures the power to draw districts. In fact, this is the 
method of choice in 33 of the 43 states that are large enough to contain multiple districts (“State-
by-State”). 
While polls are taken fairly regularly on Americans’ opinions on redistricting reform, little 
has been done to address what affects these opinions beyond partisanship. Just as is the case with 
most political issues, it is assumed that partisan cues play a large role in shaping people’s 
opinions on such reforms. In determining how partisanship affects opinions on redistricting 
reform, researchers have examined two separate relationships: how a party’s ideology affects 
that person’s opinion, or how a party’s status as the winning or losing party in the state 
legislature affects that person’s opinion (McCarthy, 2019) (VanderMolen and Milyo, 2016). For 
example, in Michigan, people’s opinions were likely swayed by their partisan affiliation because 
state Democratic leaders largely supported Proposition 2, while state Republican leaders largely 
opposed it (Beggin, 2018).  
Researchers have also suspected that, in tandem with the idea that a party’s status as the 
winning or losing party affects a person’s opinion, people’s votes on electoral reform are 
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determined by self-interest (Bowler, Donavan, and Karp, 2006). Essentially, people will vote in a 
way that maximizes their party’s chances of winning future elections. This principle is best 
encapsulated by a quote from Sarah Anderson, a Michigan Republican Party spokeswoman. 
Anderson called Voters Not Politicians, the organization that led the effort to pass Proposition 2, 
a “front group who wants to change the rules because they can’t win based on their ideas. VNP is 
a scam perpetrated by Democrats who are hoping to hoodwink Michigan voters into giving up 
their voice in the redistricting process” (Eggert, 2018). This quote illustrates that people may 
have perceived their vote on Proposition 2 as affecting their party’s ability to win future 
elections. However, given the relative newness of redistricting reform efforts, no case study has 
been done to understand this effect. 
As such, my thesis seeks to answer the question: how valid are key narratives surrounding 
public opinion on redistricting reform? A case study of Michigan’s Proposition 2 can help to 
answer this question. While I suspect that partisan identification plays the largest role in shaping 
opinions, very little has been done to study how the characteristics of a person’s district, such as 
electoral competitiveness, affect their willingness to vote for redistricting reform measures, and 
how that plays into voting in self-interest. By identifying precincts where people voted contrary 
to their party on Proposition 2 (which is determined by comparing their yes/no vote on 
Proposition 2 to the party of the winner of the most recent Senatorial and Gubernatorial 
elections), I can isolate situations where partisan identification was not the main determinant of a 
person’s vote. I hypothesize that, in these districts, electoral competitiveness and self-interest 
will play a significant role in determining a person’s vote. In each of these cases, I expect that 
less electoral competitiveness will cause a vote contrary to partisan cues. In precincts where 
Democratic candidates won but people voted against Proposition 2, I expect them to have had a 
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safe Democratic U.S. House seat with a well-liked Representative for a long period of time. 
Therefore, they would rather preserve the lack of competitiveness to keep the seat safe. Or, in a 
district where a Republican Representative was elected but people voted for Proposition 2, I 
suspect they will have had a relatively safe Democratic seat with little ability for a Republican to 
challenge the incumbent. Therefore, they seek to bring greater electoral competitiveness to their 
district to give their preferred candidate a greater chance of winning in the future. 
However, it is unlikely that partisan cues and self-interest alone can comprehensively explain 
a person’s opinion on redistricting reform measures. In the time allotted to compose an honors 
thesis, it is highly unlikely that such a complete picture can be painted. However, other narratives 
surrounding people’s opinions on redistricting reform, including populist ideals and distrust of 
government, will be discussed. Together, these factors should comprise as complete of a profile 
as possible of the factors that shape opinions on redistricting reform. 
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Chapter 1: Partisan Cues 
 
Literature Review 
Generally, people have limited information about redistricting, and therefore lack strong 
opinions on the integrity of current processes or the ways in which they should be reformed 
(Fougere, et al., 2010). When voters lack factual information about politics, they are forced to 
rely on informational cues from others (Hobolt, 2006). Zaller (1992) finds that people tend to 
give credibility to political elites, typically from their preferred party, in searching for this 
information. As a result, the information they receive is “a highly selective and stereotyped view 
of what has taken place” (7). Given that a person’s value and ideology influence both the 
information they seek and how they perceive that information, those who are liberal tend to align 
themselves with the views of liberal elites, while those who are conservative tend to align 
themselves with conservative elites. Partisan cues are so powerful that they have the ability to 
shape people’s opinions even on issues that are directly observable to them, such as poverty or 
racial inequality. This suggests that, for an issue such as gerrymandering, which is not as directly 
observable, full of political complexities, and the perception of which is based heavily on how it 
is framed, partisan cues carry even greater power to determine a person’s opinion on the validity 
of a redistricting process. 
Partisan cues are particularly influential in how people vote on ballot referenda. In fact, 
Kriesi (2005) refers to partisan cues as “the quintessential shortcut in direct democratic votes” 
(see also Hobolt, 2006). As Hobolt continues, parties have the ability to signal to voters where 
their party stands on a particular referendum, which can communicate to voters what is best for 
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them (161). In an examination of the Norwegian accession referendum, Hobolt found that 
partisan cues had the “same effect on voting behavior as detailed knowledge of EU politics,” 
provided that voters have sufficient knowledge of their party’s position (176). This conclusion is 
corroborated by Bisgaard and Slothuus (2018), who further illustrate the power of partisan 
identification in determining a person’s vote. In their first experiment, they used five survey 
waves to study attitudes on the budget deficit in Denmark. There was a change in partisan cues 
from the incumbent party between the second and third waves, in which they indicated a much 
greater concern about the increasing deficit. The authors found a statistically significant change 
in perceptions of the budget deficit among those who identified with the party in government, but 
no change among those who identified with the opposition party. This is consistent with the 
power of partisan cues, as such cues should have no effect on those who do not identify with that 
party. They even performed placebo tests on issues such as unemployment, about which many 
people are assumed to be informed, and the size of the budget deficit, which is a purely factual 
question, and found that partisan cues were still powerful. This is consistent with Zaller’s 
argument that partisan cues have the power to shape opinion even on issues that are factual or 
directly observable. They replicated this observation with an experimental design, permitting 
them to conclude causation due to comparison with a control group and the ability to show an 
effect for both parties, not just the one in power. They again found a statistically significant 
result, suggesting that partisan cues are impactful for those who identify with the party that 
disseminates them.  
Although these studies were not based on American politics, the conclusions nonetheless 
apply to American voters, who operate similarly due to their generally low levels of political 
information. Cavari and Freedman (2019) find that, as partisan cues on the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict have increased, so has the proportion of Americans who hold an opinion on it. Further, 
the opinions expressed vary predictably with party identification. Republicans surveyed 
expressed a clear support of Israel with a low nonresponse rate, which is consistent with the 
strong, pro-Israel sentiment put forward by Republican leaders. On the other hand, Democratic 
leaders are less clear in public messaging on Israel. Support for Israel from Democratic 
respondents was not as clear, and there was a much higher nonresponse rate, which is reflective 
of party leaders’ varying opinions.  
Across all of these studies, partisan cues serve as substitutes for more detailed knowledge in 
driving people’s opinions and voting decisions on referenda. As demonstrated by Fougere’s 
study, voters are generally uninformed about redistricting issues. A shortcut to developing an 
opinion can be to learn and adopt the position of one’s party. This provides party leaders with a 
powerful ability to shape the opinions of their constituents on the issue.  
The role partisanship plays in people’s voting decisions is reinforced by negative campaigns 
and a sense of rivalry between opposing parties (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012). When state 
party leaders used rhetoric that vilified opponents and replaced the discussion of the redistricting 
procedures with accusations of manipulating electoral processes for partisan gain, I anticipate 
that people became even more steadfast in their alignment with their party’s position on 
Proposition 2. When the debate was about whether or not Proposition 2 was an effort by state 
Democrats to gain more control over the elections process rather than how the proposal affects 
the representativeness of elections, partisan identity became integral to how a person perceived 
it. This effect was then compounded when the media recycled these messages and people were 
continually exposed to them (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).  
As such, I expect that, in most precincts, voting on Proposition 2 will predictably follow 
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partisanship, which can be gauged through the result of the most recent Gubernatorial and 
Senatorial elections. In each precinct, a win for Republican candidates will typically accompany 
a defeat for Proposition 2, and a win for Democratic candidates will typically be paired with a 
win for Proposition 2. However, theories of partisan cues cannot explain precincts where such 
consistency is not present. As such, further exploration beyond the effect of partisanship on 
public opinion on redistricting reform is necessary. I hypothesize district characteristics and 
perceptions of electoral competitiveness will play the largest role in shaping this opinion, while 
distrust in government will also carry weight in opinion formation.  
 
Methodology 
The dependent variable in this study is whether Michigan precincts voted “Yes” or “No” on 
Proposition 2. This data was collected from the Michigan Secretary of State’s website. Since 
each person was casting their vote for or against a reform measure, it can be used as a valid 
measure of their opinion on the issue. The independent variable is broadly defined as the 
narratives surrounding what shapes a person’s opinion on redistricting reform. In this chapter, 
the narrative on which I am focused is partisan cues, which are theorized to be the largest 
influence on a person’s opinion or vote on any given political issue.  
This chapter will use precinct-level data that was downloaded as a .txt file and cleaned in R. I 
will determine the party with which the majority of people in a particular precinct identify by 
using the results of the 2018 Gubernatorial and Senatorial elections, with the assumption that 
voters often vote for their party’s candidate. While this will not be true in every case, it is the 
most reliable way to determine the partisan makeup of a precinct without access to 
comprehensive data on party registration. Further, this is a fairly common method of determining 
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partisan affiliation or ideology in Political Science. Erickson and Wright (1980) conduct their 
study of legislators’ responsiveness to the opinions of their constituents “presuming that 
presidential voting is indicative of district ideology,” and numerous authors since have used the 
same measure based on this study. While there was no presidential election in 2018, these two 
races are a good indication of a person’s party because they are high-profile and highly 
publicized. In a year without a presidential election, it can be assumed that these two races would 
be the elections that likely received the most attention. Thus, there are consistent cues from party 
leaders encouraging party members to vote for their chosen candidates. Further, the results of 
multiple elections were included to ensure that a precinct solidly identifies with one party or 
another. While straight-ticket voting is not uncommon, there are a fair number of precincts where 
candidates from different parties win races. Including multiple elections makes it more certain 
that the election results truly reflect the partisan makeup of the precinct by identifying precincts 
where a majority of voters voted for the same party across elections. Assuming that voters follow 
the cues of their party leaders, the results of these elections will typically predict the vote on 
Proposition 2. If Republican candidates win, I will expect Proposition 2 to be defeated in that 
precinct, while the opposite would be expected if Democrats were to win that precinct.  
As explained previously, partisan cues are often credited with being the primary determinant 
of a person’s opinion on political issues given the credibility people grant to political elites in 
soliciting information. I suspect that a person’s opinion on redistricting reform is no exception to 
this rule, and this case study will allow me to examine this principle. In an attempt to estimate 
the impact of partisan cues as precisely as possible, I will also be performing a regression 
analysis. As with the prior approach described, this is also a fairly common method. For 
example, Gerber, Kessler, and Meredith (2011) regressed precinct data onto the amount of mail 
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sent to a precinct to determine how much it increased a candidate’s vote share. To determine the 
impact of partisan cues on the vote shares for and against Proposition 2, I will be regressing the 
Proposition 2 results onto the results of the Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections in 2018. This 
regression will align with the expected vote patterns described previously.  Thus, I will regress 
voting “Yes” on Proposition 2 (the dependent variable) onto voting for the Democratic candidate 
in both the Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections (the independent variable). I will also regress 
voting “No” on Proposition 2 onto voting for the Republican candidates. In accordance with my 
hypothesis, I expect a strong positive correlation between the two in both cases.  
 
Precinct-Level Data: Proposition 2 
If my hypothesis is correct, in the majority of precincts, the vote on Proposition 2 will follow 
reliably from the results of the Gubernatorial and Senatorial elections. If both winners were 
Republicans, a vote against Proposition 2 is to be expected. A vote for Proposition 2 is to be 
expected if both winners are Democrats.  
Of the 4797 precincts (excluding precincts classified as Absent Voter Counting Board, or 
AVCB) in Michigan active during the 2018 election, 3141 followed partisan cues from either 
Democrats or Republicans (See Figure 1). Precincts that voted for independent candidates or 
candidates affiliated with minor parties were excluded from this analysis, as there were no 
consistent cues with which to compare their vote choices. Precincts that were split between 
Democratic and Republican candidates across the two elections were also excluded, as they 
lacked a solid partisan affiliation based on these results. The fact that the majority of solidly 
partisan districts conform with partisan cues is consistent with my hypothesis and is to be 
expected based on trends in the literature. However, the most interesting element of this analysis 
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is the source of the deviation from partisan cues. I initially expected there to be some deviation 
from both parties, as both Democrats and Republicans are subject to influences other than 
partisan cues, such as electoral self-interest. By and large, though, Democrats followed cues. In 
fact, there was only a single precinct where the two Democratic candidates won and Proposition 
2 lost. In contrast, there were 1437 precincts where people voted for two Republican candidates 
and voted for Proposition 2, compared to only 717 precincts where Republicans voted 
consistently with partisan cues across the three elections.  
 










2424 1 713 1437 
 
The regression analyses demonstrate a similar result:  
 
 Figure 2: Regression of “Yes” Votes on Votes for Both Democratic Candidates (2018) 
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 With an r-value of 0.9368, it is clear there is a strong positive correlation between having 
voted for both Democratic candidates (Gretchen Whitmer for Governor and Debbie Stabenow 
for Senate) and voting “Yes” on Proposition 2. With each increase in one percent of the vote 
share for the two candidates, there is approximately a 0.56 percentage point increase in “Yes” 
votes for Proposition 2. In a hypothetical precinct in which 100% of voters voted for both 
Democratic candidates, the expected vote share in support of Proposition 2 would be 86.73%. 
This matches the results from the initial precinct data analysis, as both show a strong alignment 
between votes for Democratic candidates and votes for Proposition 2. This suggests that 
Democratic voters were highly attentive to (and voted in accordance with) cues from their party. 
 
 Figure 3: Regression of “No” Votes on Votes for Both Republican Candidates (2018) 
  
 
The regression of “No” Votes on Proposition 2 on the votes for the two Republican 
candidates (Bill Schuette for Governor and John James for Senate) show virtually the same 
results as could have been inferred from the first regression, but the second regression was run to 
take into account the impact of the vote share for candidates outside of the two major parties. As 
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expected, there is a strong positive correlation between voting for both Republican candidates 
and voting against Proposition 2 (r-value = 0.9369). This is in accordance with my hypothesis. 
However, where the data for Republicans differs from that of Democrats is the strength of those 
cues, as measured by the hypothetical precinct in which all voters cast votes for the two 
candidates from one party. In the hypothetical all-Democratic precinct, the vote share for 
Proposition 2 would be 86.73%. However, in the all-Republican precinct, the vote share against 
Proposition 2 - while still a majority - would not nearly be as overwhelming. The expected vote 
share against Proposition 2 would be slightly over 15 percentage points less at 71.50%. This is 
not to say that Republican cues are not impactful. Clearly, they are a strong determinant of their 
members’ votes. Still, as shown by both the initial precinct data analysis and the regression 
analyses, the cues are not nearly as strong as those of the state Democratic party, which is why 
there is so much more deviation from expected trends.  
 
Limitations 
As mentioned previously, the primary limitation in this part of the study is the lack of access 
to a party registry. Thus, there is no way to truly determine if a precinct is made up of a majority 
of registered Democrats or Republicans. While using the results of multiple high-profile 
elections as a proxy for partisanship is reliable, there is the potential for these elections to 
misrepresent a precinct’s partisan makeup. This may occur because these two elections were 
anomalies, while the vast majority of other elections went in favor of the other party, or because 
the precinct swings from election year to election year. The use of multiple elections, combined 
with the high-profile and competitive partisan nature of these elections, should minimize the 
impact of the first concern. It is unlikely that a precinct made up primarily of voters registered 
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with one party would vote for opposition candidates in two major elections. Further, in precincts 
where there were winners from different parties, that precinct was excluded from the analysis as 
a precinct that lacked a solid partisan identification.  
The second concern is raised in a paper by Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman (2008), who 
contend that using presidential electoral returns as a measure of district ideology is subject to 
short-term influences such as the appeal of a particular candidate or the saliency of certain issues. 
Once again, the use of multiple elections makes it less likely that the partisanship of a precinct is 
due to short-term issues, and instead is a stable partisan identification that persists across election 
years. Additionally, this critique is specifically related to using presidential election returns, and 
the races used in these analyses races are less likely to flip voters based on pure candidate appeal 
than a presidential election.  
There is also merit to narrowing the focus of my analysis to partisan identification only in 
2018, as I am interested in the partisan affiliation of the majority of voters in a particular precinct 
in this particular election year (2018). Once again, presuming that these elections indicate voters’ 
partisan identification, I would expect them to follow cues from the party with which they 
identify for other policy issues as well, including ballot referenda. If the precincts were split in 
2018, they were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, this analysis only included data from 
solidly Democrat or solidly Republican districts, which indicates the majority of voters in a 
particular precinct likely followed those party’s cues during that election cycle. It is unlikely that 
a district massively swung between parties all the way down the ballot from elections just a few 
years prior, even if they may have done so for a high-profile office such as the presidency. Still, 
even if they did, the fact that they followed cues from a different party in a prior election year 
has little bearing on their current identification with one party or the other and the accompanying 
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inclination to follow that party’s cues. 
Another limitation of this study is the ability to account for absentee ballots that are counted 
separately through Absentee Voter Counting Boards (AVCB). There is no uniform way that each 
county classifies its AVCB votes in order to affiliate them with a particular precinct, which 
makes them difficult to include in this analysis. However, unlike 2020, the circumstances were 
not such that a significantly large number of people would be voting by mail. Further, given that 
the AVCB ballots are not affiliated with a particular precinct, the number of votes split amongst 
all the precincts in a particular county would be marginal and unlikely to swing an individual 
precinct. Therefore, this should not inhibit the accuracy of this analysis. 
Finally, there is the Ecological Inference Problem, which is concerned with drawing 
conclusions about individual behavior from aggregate data. While there is no way to isolate the 
vote of each individual voter beyond an examination of precinct data, performing a regression 
analysis to determine how likely a precinct is to vote for/against Proposition 2 based on the 
results of the other two elections in their precinct will allow me to get as close as possible to 
examining individual behavior. While I cannot definitively say that an individual voted one way 
or the other because of partisan cues (causation), the strong positive correlations enable me to 
comfortably conclude that partisan cues played a role. After all, precinct data is composed of the 
choices of each of its voters, and thus trends in the precinct data provide significant insight into 
the opinions and behavior of individual voters. 
 
Discussion 
Despite these limitations, there are still a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this 
data. The first is that my hypothesis was largely correct: many Michigan voters did vote as 
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expected in accordance with partisan cues on Proposition 2. The majority of precincts 
(3141/4797) that were either solidly Democratic or solidly Republican voted as expected on 
Proposition 2. This is, as suggested by Fougere, Hobolt, and other political theorists, likely due 
to a lack of information on redistricting. When voters lack information on a political issue, 
partisan cues can serve as an informational shortcut that guides their voting decisions. 
However, the strength of partisan cues was not the same for both parties. When voters voted 
down the ballot for Democratic candidates, they voted as predicted on Proposition 2 the vast 
majority of the time. This was not true to the same extent for Republicans. There could be a 
number of explanations for this. It could be a larger volume of and/or more accessible messaging 
from the state Democratic party to its members. Or, as indicated by the higher-than-expected 
levels of Republican support, it may be that this ballot measure had broad popularity due to its 
appeals to fairness and electoral integrity. These were the values that support groups such as 
Voters Not Politicians espoused in their promotion of the referendum. This type of messaging 
may have the power to transcend party lines, but for Democrats, voting for Proposition 2 for this 
reason is not discernible from voting for the measure because of partisan cues. This would be 
more easily observable for Republican voters, who would have to vote in opposition to their 
party to vote in accordance with such messaging. The accessibility and appeal of pro-Proposition 
2 messaging and how that affected voters’ choice is a topic worthy of further research.  
As a result of the differences between the two parties found in this chapter, from this point 
forward, the focus of the project will shift slightly. The main focus is to determine what affects a 
person’s opinion on redistricting reform measures. However, for Democrats, there was very little 
deviation from partisan cues, which tends to be the main determinant of a person’s opinion of 
political issues. Thus, the remainder of this thesis will examine more closely the cause of a 
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sizable amount of deviation from partisan cues for Republicans. Chapter 2, which will analyze 
the influence of electoral self-interest, will still reference the Democratic deviation (although, it 
is unlikely that any significant conclusions can be drawn from the one non-conforming precinct). 
Chapter 3 will focus solely on the source of Republican deviation by examining the influence of 
Populism, which has been associated with the Republican party under President Trump.  
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Chapter 2: Electoral Self-Interest 
 
Literature Review 
 Anthony Downs, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and influential political 
economist, (1957) contends that voters are rational actors, in that they weigh the costs and gains, 
both politically and economically, of voting for a particular candidate or policy and make their 
choice based on the greatest net benefit. Downs “assume[s] that every individual, though 
rational, is also selfish,” meaning that these cost-benefit analyses are self-interested and 
concerned with maximizing personal gains (27). Downs discusses these concepts in the context 
of choosing which political party to vote for, but it can certainly be applied to voting on electoral 
reforms as well. If a person believes one party offers them more benefits than the other, then 
their interest lies in that party winning future elections. This makes it more likely that such 
benefits will be delivered. Further, there is additional utility from the perception that one is being 
accurately represented in government, the feeling of which is enhanced by having a 
representative of the party with which a person identifies elected in their district. 
Electoral self-interest, or acting in ways that a voter perceives will maximize their party’s 
chances of winning future elections, seems to exert significant influence on people’s opinion on 
redistricting reform. Those who identify with the party in control of the state legislature, who 
often handle the redistricting processes, tend to believe the process is fair more often than those 
who do not (Fougere, et al., 2010). Yet, in general, people tend to find processes of redistricting 
to be fairer when carried out by a nonpartisan body, rather than by a state legislature. Still, 
despite the fact that only 10% of those surveyed prefer redistricting be handled by state 
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legislatures, most states continue to use this method. Kathryn VanderMolen and Jeffry Milyo 
(2016) suggest that this disparity may persist because confidence in redistricting procedures is 
not related to the process itself. Instead, people tend to view the system more favorably when 
their party is in control. This is because, when their party is in control, they stand to benefit from 
the way districts are drawn.  
Politicians similarly tend to perceive the integrity of redistricting processes in a self-
interested fashion (Bowler, Donavan, and Karp, 2006). While values such as fair democracy and 
political ideologies play a role, the main predictor of politicians’ attitudes toward redistricting 
issues is electoral self-interest. In surveying national-level politicians in Germany, Australia, 
Holland, and New Zealand over a three-year period, Bowler, Donavan, and Karp found that 
those who lost their elections were more likely to support changes to electoral institutions than 
winners and be less satisfied with the current functioning of their democracy. Inherent in these 
perceptions is the idea that a more “legitimate” system is one that maximizes their party’s 
chances of winning elections. Even federal judges are prone to evaluating the legitimacy of 
district maps through the lens of their party’s interests. In cases where the law or precedent are 
ambiguous, judges tend to strike down district maps drawn by the party opposite to the judge 
reviewing the case (McKenzie, 2012). 
These theories explain much of the landscape of opinion on Proposition 2 in Michigan 
around the time of its passage. Since Republicans controlled the state legislature, they generally 
opposed the policy. The opposite was true for the Democrats, as they sought reform because they 
did not have significant influence on district maps in the status quo. This literature also serves to 
explain my hypothesis on how electoral competitiveness affects people’s opinion. People vote 
for the option that maximizes the chance of their desired representative to win a seat, which, in 
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each case, necessitates either more or less electoral competitiveness. Still, no case study has been 
done to directly compare perceptions of electoral competitiveness to a person’s opinion on 
redistricting reform, which is where my study can add to current scholarship.  
 
Methodology 
Beyond partisanship, electoral self-interest is the primary factor I expect to have an influence 
on people’s opinions on redistricting reform. Essentially, people will vote on electoral reform 
proposals in ways that maximize their party’s chances of winning future elections, which could 
conflict with partisan cues. Redistricting reform is often aimed at making congressional elections 
more competitive. However, for a majority Democratic precinct with a long-serving Democratic 
Representative, people may not be interested in increasing electoral competitiveness in a way 
that threatens the safety of that seat (even if the party supports the proposal). Or, in a majority 
Republican precinct in an uncompetitive district with a Democratic Representative, people may 
be interested in making elections more competitive in a way that allows for a successful 
Republican challenger. While the party is encouraging voters to vote a certain way based on 
state-level politics, individuals may prioritize their own district at the polls. Thus, the primary 
hypothesis in this chapter is restated as follows: 
H1: In a safe Democratic district, Republicans will be incentivized to deviate from 
partisan cues and vote for Proposition 2 in an attempt to improve their party’s chances 
of winning future elections in their district. 
Previously, my second hypothesis would have been: In a safe Democratic district, Democrats 
will be incentivized to deviate from partisan cues and vote against Proposition 2 in an attempt to 
safeguard their party’s chances of winning future elections. However, as was revealed in the 
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previous chapter, there was only one instance of Democratic deviation from partisan cues. Thus, 
there is not enough data to draw conclusions on this hypothesis. As mentioned at the end of the 
previous chapter, the remainder of this thesis will instead focus on explaining Republican 
deviation from partisan cues because Democrats overwhelmingly conformed. 
The dependent variable in this chapter is still how Michigan precincts voted on redistricting 
reform, which is measured through the results of the vote on Proposition 2. The independent 
variable is electoral competitiveness. Electoral competitiveness can be measured through 
examining the average electoral margin of victory for U.S House races in each district in 2012, 
2014, and 2016. These are the three election cycles prior to 2018 that used the same district map 
at the time of Proposition 2 being on the ballot. As Barber and Schmidt (2018) note, while there 
is no perfect measure of electoral competitiveness, examining the margin of victory in an 
election in the past cycle is the closest approximation. By examining that statistic over multiple 
election cycles, I can get a greater understanding of a district’s competitiveness in the long term, 
as well as see how the presence of a long-serving Representative may affect how someone votes 
on Proposition 2.  
To evaluate my hypothesis, I will compare the percentage of Republican precincts (as 
classified by voting for the Republican candidate for both Governor and Senate) that deviated 
from partisan cues in each district. These are precincts that voted Republican for Senate, 
Republican for Governor, and “Yes” for Proposition 2. If my hypothesis is correct, the 
percentage of Republican precincts that deviated from partisan cues will be higher in districts 
that are safely Democratic than those that are safely Republican, as Republicans will be 
interested in changing the electoral system in places where they believe it could benefit them 
(despite their party’s cues). In safe Republican districts, they have little incentive to change the 
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system, along with the fact that their party is discouraging them from voting to do so. 
I will also run a regression analysis similar to the one used in Chapter 1. For each 
congressional district, I will use election results to determine the vote share against Proposition 2 
in a hypothetical precinct where 100% of voters voted for both Republican candidates (Bill 
Schuette for Governor and John James for Senator). If my hypothesis is correct, the percentage 
of voters who would vote against Proposition 2 would be lower in safe Democratic districts than 
safe Republican districts. In Democratic districts, this percentage would also get lower as the 
margin of victory got higher (essentially, as the Democratic district got safer). If that were the 
case, it would indicate a deviation from partisan cues in accordance with electoral self-interest.  
 
Electoral Competitiveness Data 
There does not appear to be a significant difference in the percentage of Republican precinct 
deviations based on whether or not the district in which they are located is safely Democratic or 
safely Republican. In fact, in every district, over 50% of solidly Republican precincts voted for 


































1 Republican  7.4 164 222 57.51% 
2 Republican 29.1 81 119 59.50% 
3 Republican 16.4 42 124 72.90% 
4 Republican 25.5 119 187 61.11% 
5 Democrat 31.7 17 87 83.65% 
6 Republican 16.6 47 121 72.02% 
7 Republican 12.5 58 142 71.00% 
8 Republican 16.9 37 130 77.80% 
9 Democrat 24.2 0 49 100% 
10 Republican 36.4 141 144 50.53% 
11 Republican 11.5 4 91 95.79% 
12 Democrat 35.9 0 16 100% 
13 Democrat 64.6 0 1 100% 
14 Democrat 61.5 3 4 57.14% 
 
While the only precincts with a 100% deviation rate are in safe Democratic districts, the 
number of Republican precincts in these districts is small compared to the number of precincts in 
the safe Republican districts. Further, there are some Democratic districts with lower rates of 
deviation than Republican districts (for example, District 5, a Democratic district, has a deviation 
rate of 83.65%, while District 11, a Republican district, has a deviation rate of 95.79%, and the 
two districts have a similar number of solidly Republican precincts). Therefore, it does not 
appear that electoral self-interest has a significant impact on people’s vote choice on Proposition 
2. 
The single Democratic deviation is in District 1, which is the Republican district with the 
lowest margin of victory. The single deviation is not enough to draw any conclusions about the 
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influence of electoral self-interest on Democrats’ vote choice on Proposition 2, but it is 
nonetheless interesting to note that the only deviation is in a Republican district. This would 
provide an additional bit of evidence that electoral self-interest is unlikely to affect a person’s 
opinion on redistricting reform, regardless of partisan identification. If it were to be the case, I 
would instead expect any instances of Democratic deviation to be in the safest Democratic 
districts, rather than in a district that leans Republican in the status quo (and, in this case, is the 
most competitive district in Michigan). 
The regression analyses, when comparing Democratic and Republican districts, largely 
corroborate the findings revealed in Figure 4 (see Appendix A for detailed regressions): 
 





















1 Republican  7.4 83.35% 
2 Republican 29.1 70.21% 
3 Republican 16.4 72.16% 
4 Republican 25.5 81.27% 
5 Democrat 31.7 68.75% 
6 Republican 16.6 74.13% 
7 Republican 12.5 76.46% 
8 Republican 16.9 76.91% 
9 Democrat 24.2 74.73% 
10 Republican 36.4 74.22% 
11 Republican 11.5 73.46% 
12 Democrat 35.9 84.92% 
13 Democrat 64.6 69.36% 
14 Democrat 61.5 62.83% 
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 There is no pattern of clear, consistent deviation from the expected percentage of 
Republican voters who would vote against Proposition 2 in accordance with partisan cues as 
found in Chapter 1 (71.50%) in safe Democratic districts. This provides additional evidence that 
electoral self-interest plays a limited role in voters’ choices. For three of the five Democratic 
districts, the percentage does not differ much from safe Republican districts (68.75% in District 
5, 74.73% in District 9, and 69.36% in District 13). Most safe Republican districts were between 
70% and 75%. Two of the three extreme values are from Democratic districts, but if the 
hypothesis is correct, both would be significantly lower than the percentage in safe Republican 
districts. Instead, while the value in District 14 is lower at 62.83%, the value in District 12 is 
much higher at 84.92%. This is actually the highest value on the table, and would have been 
associated with a safe Republican district if H1 was correct. Therefore, the regression analyses 
provide evidence against H1.  
 However, an additional regression analysis of this data suggests that, although the effect is 
somewhat weak, there is some correlation between a decreasing Republican margin of victory 
and a decreasing percentage of Republican voters who vote against Proposition 2. In a regression 
of expected vote percentage against Proposition 2 on Democratic margin of victory (the 
Republican margins of victory were made negative), the percentage of Republicans voting 
against Proposition 2 decreased by 0.066% for every percentage increase in the Democratic 
margin of victory (or decrease in the Republican margin of victory) (see Appendix B). The 
effect, although still small, becomes more pronounced when the regression is run only for the 
Democratic districts. For every increase in the Democratic margin of victory, the percentage of 
Republicans voting against Proposition 2 decreases by 0.24% (see Appendix B). Overall, the 
correlation for both is between -0.25 and -0.26. While this does not suggest that electoral self-
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interest has a significant influence on vote choice, it does provide some support for H1 and 
suggests electoral self-interest plays a minor role in shaping people’s opinions.    
 
Limitations 
The same limitations regarding the use of precinct data mentioned in Chapter 1 one apply to 
this chapter as well. For the same reasons, this data can still be useful in drawing conclusions 
about voter behavior. The only unique limitation in this chapter, which is related to the time and 
scope of this project, is the potential for state-level election data to reveal additional insight into 
this hypothesis. While federal election data did not reveal any trends suggesting that electoral 
self-interest played a significant role in people’s decisions on Proposition 2, this could be 
because federal elections feel more distant. U.S. House elections are spread over a much larger 
district, so the effects of competitiveness may not be as immediately felt. However, state-level 
elections are fairly local, as the districts cover a much smaller area. Thus, people may have voted 
in accordance with electoral self-interest based on their perceptions of state-level elections, the 
competitiveness of which may be much more easily observed. However, this data analysis would 
not reveal these effects. This would be a valuable subject of future research.  
 
Discussion 
There are a number of possibilities as to why self-interest was not a significant influence on 
vote choice for Proposition 2. Just as a lack of information on redistricting may have motivated 
people to defer to partisan cues, so might a lack of information have prevented them from voting 
in accordance with self-interest. After all, to truly know what is best for a voter or their party, the 
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voter would have to know the relevant details and the potential outcome of each choice. If people 
lack the information on their district’s competitiveness or how the redistricting system may 
change that, this is unlikely to have affected their vote.  
Philip Converse (1964) writes that belief systems must be bound by constraints, which are 
justifications for beliefs that provide logic and consistency. However, the average voter often 
lacks the political context necessary to develop them. Typically, constraints are developed by 
elites, just as we saw with Proposition 2. Elites include politicians, journalists, academics, and 
other highly attentive and influential actors in the political arena. In this case, partisan elites 
consistently framed the issue in terms of electoral self-interest. State Democratic leaders framed 
Proposition 2 as an effort to check the power of Republicans gerrymandering districts, while 
state Republican leaders framed it as a Democratic ploy to steal elections because they could not 
win them in the status quo. However, Converse notes that such constraints are often transmitted 
imperfectly to voters. Thus, while voters may get the broader message to vote for or against 
Proposition 2, the full extent of the complexities of how voting on the measure may affect 
electoral competitiveness is likely not received. Further, Fougere’s finding that Americans 
generally have low levels of information on redistricting suggests they are unlikely to get this 
information elsewhere. Ultimately, if voters do not have this information, they cannot make 
choices in accordance with rational self-interest, which is contingent on being able to evaluate 
and compare outcomes. 
Instead, findings from Sears, et al. (1980) align with the results from Chapter 1. The authors 
conclude that symbolic considerations such as partisan identification are much more reliable 
predictors of vote choice than self-interest. These symbolic political factors are learned through 
socialization in pre-adult years, which have little to do with rational calculations of future costs 
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and benefits. As a result, when exposed to policy issues as adults, they evaluate them through 
these symbolic lenses. The authors analyzed data from the 1976 Current Population Survey, 
finding that symbolic political factors such as people’s partisan or ideological identification were 
significantly more impactful on preferences related to healthcare, unemployment, busing, and 
law and order than self-interest. 
Although focused on the national economy instead of electoral politics, findings from Kinder 
and Kiewiet (1981) provide further evidence that self-interest is not a strong determinant of vote 
choice. The authors call voting with concern for the national economy “Sociotropic voting,” 
which they found to have significant effects on vote choices in both congressional and 
presidential elections (145, 152). Kinder and Kiewet find that these perceptions are not an 
extension of pocketbook (personal self-interest) preferences. Instead, voters are much more 
interested in voting based on which party they believe is better equipped to handle national 
economic issues, even if this only has more distant effects on their individual well-being. 
Similarly, the data reveals that voters are not overly concerned with the impact of their vote 
on Proposition 2 on their party’s ability to win elections in their own district. Instead, they may 
be concerned with voting with their party’s preferences for broader electoral self-interest across 
the state. This can be discerned from the overarching message of partisan cues and does not 
require extensive information. It is also possible that voters may be more concerned with the 
broader issues of fairness and electoral integrity that were also possible reasons for why voters 
may have deviated from partisan cues. This would be more in-line with focusing on broader 
well-being, as was the case with voters who voted based on perceived national economic 
outcomes rather than personal well-being. Once again, further research on the effects of these 
values would provide a better understanding of public opinion on redistricting reform.  
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Chapter 3: Populist Ideals 
 
Literature Review 
Inherent in the cries for redistricting reform are themes of government distrust, diminished 
popular sovereignty, and the threat of corruption from leaving the power to draw districts in the 
hands of politicians who stand to benefit from manipulating the system. Such attitudes affect 
how Americans perceive the legitimacy of the country’s democracy. Perceptions of electoral 
integrity, as reflected in global standards regarding appropriate elections conduct, are central to 
people’s level of satisfaction with democracy (Norris, 2019). This is because elected officials are 
supposed to be representatives of the people, and the only way to ensure accountability is free 
and fair elections. Dahlberg and Solevid (2016) found across four different models, each 
controlling for various individual and system-level variables, that even just perceptions of 
manipulation or corruption significantly reduce political trust.  
 Reynolds, Reily, and Ellis (2006) find that electoral reforms tend to occur when there is 
“high public mistrust and dissatisfaction with the political system” (20). This is corroborated by 
Norris’s (2011) analysis of survey data collected prior to electoral reforms in over 90 
independent countries. Norris finds that “mass aspirations for democracy are indeed one of the 
factors which help to catalyze the agenda for successful reform movements and legislative 
initiatives” (545). Essentially, people’s perceptions of an ideal democracy shape electoral reform 
efforts, and distrust of a political system that is perceived to be illegitimate drives public 
engagement to make those reforms a reality.  
Such distrust of the political establishment became particularly salient during President 
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Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign. By studying polling data around the time of the 2016 New 
Hampshire primary, Dyck, Pearson-Merkowitz, and Coates (2018) found that those with less 
trust in government were more likely to support Trump than other Republican candidates. The 
authors conclude that this was a rebuke of establishment politicians in an era of increasing 
distrust in the political system. As such, some Trump Republicans may not be conservatives as 
much as they are Populists, or those “whose political sympathies lie with the non-elite and 
marginalized” (Lakoff, 2017). Populists consider the people and elites to be in irreconcilable 
opposition, and the elites are characterized by self-interest and corruption (Silgo, 2018). This 
viewpoint is accompanied by a feeling of powerlessness and inability to participate meaningfully 
in politics, which leads people to seek identification with a populist movement that they perceive 
will better their chances of being fairly represented in government.  
This rhetoric was central to President Trump’s campaign, and, as a result, caused many who 
identified with these values to align themselves with the Republican party under his leadership. 
His campaign was characterized by populist messaging from the moment he announced his run 
for the Presidency. Oliver and Rahn (2016) used a content analysis and the Diction software 
program to measure the use of anti-establishment rhetoric, with “political populism” being 
captured by phrases such as “the government,” “the system,” or “special interests,” among others 
(192). Trump scored the highest of seven leading 2016 presidential candidates on the measure of 
political populism in his announcement speech, with a higher use of such language than well-
known anti-establishment candidate Senator Bernie Sanders. In terms of Trump’s supporters, a 
survey conducted by the authors revealed they scored high on measures of anti-elitism and 
mistrust of expertise. While these voters turned out for Trump, the important distinction here is 
that those who identify more strongly on these measures may not be voting Republican because 
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they are Conservative in the traditional sense of the word. Instead, they found their anti-elitism 
and mistrust of the political establishment echoed in President Trump’s campaign, which led to 
an identification with the current Republican Party under Trump.  
Such feelings of distrust and marginalization may lead to supporting measures such as 
Proposition 2. Norris, Garnett, and Grömping (2020) posit that populist attitudes are 
accompanied by an inclination toward conspiratorial thinking, which can result in a paranoia 
about the integrity of elections. Using American National Election Study (ANES) data and the 
2016 election as a case study, the authors find that “there is a significant negative relationship 
between populist orientations and beliefs about the fairness of the vote,” with “a 0.4-point 
difference in predicted trust in fairness between those with the lowest and highest populist 
values” (117). This correlation remains stable regardless of whether or not the respondent’s party 
is in power, which contrasts with the way in which the power of a person’s party was theorized 
to mediate views of electoral integrity in Chapter 2 of this paper. Ultimately, a sense of 
“cynicism about politics… and a consequential distrust in the efficacy of democratic values and 
processes” leads to support for policies that check the government’s power and promote equity in 
the electoral system (Silgo, 2018: 134). As a result, such Trump Republicans may be voting for a 
Republican representative because they identify with the Republican party’s identity under 
Trump, but also support Proposition 2 because of a distrust of government. This can explain a 
deviation from the expected Republican vote against Proposition 2 in alignment with partisan 
cues.   
 
Methodology 
As with the first two chapters, the dependent variable in this scenario is how each precinct 
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voted on redistricting reform (as measured through their vote on Proposition 2). In this chapter, I 
will only be examining the non-conforming Republican districts, and the independent variable is 
populist ideals. I expect populist ideals to play a role in people’s opinions because Proposition 2 
places a check on government power by transferring the responsibility of drawing districts from 
the state legislature, which is subject to the influence of self-interested politicians, to a 
nonpartisan commission made up of private citizens.  
A useful measure of populism is to observe if a precinct flipped from voting for President 
Obama in 2012 to President Trump in 2016. Both candidates, although from separate parties, 
embodied populism in their rejection of establishment politics. If a person voted for both Obama 
and Trump, the lack of partisan consistency makes the vote for President Trump in 2016 seem to 
be less due to principled Conservatism and more due to populism and an identification with the 
Republican Party under President Trump. Similar to the precinct data analysis from Chapter 1, I 
downloaded the data for the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections from the Michigan Secretary of 
State’s website. It was downloaded as a .txt file, and it was cleaned and organized in R. The 
results from 2012 and 2016 were then compared for the solidly Republican precincts that voted 
for Proposition 2 in 2018. 
Another useful measure of populism is the share of each precinct that voted for President 
Obama and President Trump in 2012 and 2016, respectively. The votes the two candidates got 
between the two elections will be totaled, and I will calculate the percentage of the total votes 
between the two elections earned by Obama and Trump (see Appendix C). If the vote share for 
the two candidates totaled over 50% for a precinct between the two elections, that precinct will 
be considered to have populist ideals for the purpose of this analysis. There will be both an 
analysis of how many non-conforming Republican precincts in 2018 had a vote share of 50% or 
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higher for the two candidates, as well as a regression analysis to determine to what extent voting 
for populist candidates in non-conforming Republican districts correlated with a vote for 
Proposition 2.  
The hypotheses for this chapter are as follows: 
H1: A significant number of non-conforming Republican precincts will have voted 
for President Obama in 2012 and President Trump in 2016. 
This is unlikely to explain every deviation, and this is also not to say that it will necessarily 
explain a majority. This measure, which involves a flipped precinct, will show the more extreme 
cases of voting almost solely based on populist ideals instead of based on partisanship. The latter 
two measures will more directly examine the correlation between vote shares for these two 
candidates and “Yes” votes on Proposition 2, which are less extreme measures and more likely to 
show a broader effect. 
 H2: The majority of non-conforming Republican precincts will have a vote share of  
  over 50% for President Obama and President Trump between 2012 and 2016,  
  respectively. 
H3: In non-conforming Republican districts, there will be a moderate to strong 
positive correlation between the vote share for President Trump and President 
Obama and the percentage of “Yes” votes on Proposition 2. 
 
Precinct Data: 2012 & 2016 Presidential Elections 
H1: A significant number of non-conforming Republican precincts will have voted 
for President Obama in 2012 and President Trump in 2016. 
Of the 1437 Republican precincts that deviated from partisan cues by voting for 
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Proposition 2, 206 (14.34%) of them were precincts that flipped from President Obama in 
2012 to President Trump in 2016. All but two of the precincts voted for Trump in 2016, 
but the vast majority of them also voted Republican for Mitt Romney in 2012. Therefore, 
in a majority of cases, using only a flip from Obama to Trump as a measure of populism 
does not on its own suggest that populism played a significant role in people’s opinions 
on Proposition 2. Once again, this is to be expected, as this is would be the most extreme 
form of populism one could observe. It would involve voters who rejected partisanship 
altogether in favor of voting for candidates that represented a break from establishment 
politics. Given the power of the two major parties in the American political system, this 
is not common. However, the number of 2018 Republican precincts that flipped from 
President Obama to President Trump and voted for Proposition 2 is not trivial, suggesting 
that populist ideals and distrust of government did play at least a minor role. The 
evaluation of the second and third hypotheses will examine this possible role further.  
 H2: The majority of non-conforming Republican precincts will have a vote share of  
  over 50% for President Obama and President Trump between 2012 and 2016,  
  respectively. 
The evaluation of precinct data for this hypothesis involves a lower threshold for classifying 
a precinct as populist. Instead of requiring a flip from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016, a 
precinct is instead classified as populist if the total vote share for both candidates is over 50% of 
the entire pool of votes across the two elections. This total vote share for Obama and Trump is 
composed of all the voters who supported the two major-party populist candidates. Using this 
measure, the overwhelming majority (1001/1437) of non-conforming Republican precincts 
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would have been considered populist. This too is to be expected. Unlike the measure of populism 
used to evaluate H1, this is a significantly lower threshold to be considered a populist precinct. 
Still, this measure of populism suggests that populist ideals could have played a role in people’s 
opinions on Proposition 2.  
Given that these two measures of populism suggest different conclusions about its role in 
people’s vote choice on Proposition 2, a third measure is needed to reconcile them. A regression 
of “Yes” votes on Proposition 2 on the vote share for the two candidates across the 2012 and 
2016 elections is the measure of choice (see Figure 6). It provides a more precise evaluation of 
populism’s impact on Proposition 2 vote choices than just the 50% threshold, while 
simultaneously avoiding the extremely high threshold of a flipped district.  
H3: In non-conforming Republican districts, there will be a moderate to strong 
positive correlation between the vote share for President Trump and President 
Obama and the percentage of “Yes” votes on Proposition 2. 
  
 Figure 6: Regression of “Yes” Votes on Vote Share for President Obama (2012) &  




The regression analysis reveals the most interesting results of this chapter. First and 
foremost, while the correlation is statistically significant, the correlation between the vote share 
for Obama and Trump (r = -0.2246) is not very strong relative to the correlation for partisan 
cues. Essentially, votes on Proposition 2 are not as well explained by a linear relationship with 
the vote share for Obama and Trump. The correlation is certainly expected to be weaker, as 
partisan cues were hypothesized to play the largest role, but this large of a disparity was 
unanticipated. Further, any linear correlation that can be observed is negative. For each 1 
percentage point increase in the vote share for Obama and Trump, the “Yes” votes for 
Proposition 2 decreased by approximately 0.22 percentage points. In the hypothetical precinct 
where the vote choice for Obama and Trump is zero (where voters largely voted for Hillary 
Clinton or Mitt Romney, as well as some third party or independent candidates), there would still 
be 66.61% of voters who voted for Proposition 2. Both the relatively weak correlation and the 
direction of the correlation suggest that populism, as measured by the vote share for President 
Obama and President Trump, does not play a significant role in people’s opinions on Proposition 
2. Further, even if it does, for what can be explained by this measure, the correlation is negative. 




The primary limitation for the analysis in this chapter is the changing nature of precincts over 
multiple election cycles. Precinct divisions and locations, although largely the same from year to 
year, are not exactly the same. Of the 1437 precincts studied, 27 were unable to be fully analyzed 
because of precinct changes between 2012 and 2018. For some, there was no data for a particular 
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precinct for both 2012 and 2016, and for others, it was only one of the two elections. This is not 
a large enough number to inhibit the ability to draw conclusions from this analysis, but the 
inclusion of these precincts would slightly change the results.  
 
Discussion 
Just as low levels of information about redistricting may have prevented many voters from 
factoring self-interest into their decision, it may also make it difficult for them to view politics 
through an ideological lens. At first, it may not seem that information is necessary in order to be 
ideological. In Lane’s (1962) characterization of ideology, he describes an ideology as having 
qualities such as addressing questions of leadership selection, being related to principles and 
values, describing attitudes about social institutions, rationalizing group interests, and having a 
moral tone (14-15). However, while it is one thing to identify with an ideology, it is another to 
articulate it and use it to make political judgements. This requires the political knowledge to do 
so. Studies by Converse and Zaller indicate that, although people may indicate identification 
with a liberal or conservative ideology, their foundational views on particular issues are not 
stable over time in accordance with one ideology or the other. When both researchers asked 
participants about the same political issue over time, they found inconsistencies, with Converse 
finding that only slightly more than half regularly took the same side. This is consistent with 
Converse’s discussion of constraints, which suggests that the mass public often lacks the logical 
constraints that enable them to apply an ideology with consistency to multiple issues (or even the 
same issue over time). If voters were truly voting based on a clear ideology, their foundational 
views would remain relatively consistent across time. If Michigan voters similarly lack the 
consistency needed to predictably apply an ideology to vote choice, this could explain why these 
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measures of populist ideology did not correlate with votes for Proposition 2.  
It is also possible that, contrary to my original intuition, those who vote in accordance with 
populist ideology may perceive Proposition 2 to still be pro-establishment. While some viewed 
Proposition 2 as taking the power to redistrict out of the hands of self-interested politicians and 
placing it into the hands of the people, others viewed it as a strategic political move by state 
Democrats. As mentioned earlier in the paper, some Republicans perceived it as a way to alter 
electoral processes to benefit Democrats. There is reason to believe that some populists viewed it 
this way as well. Thus, they simply saw Proposition 2 as another establishment policy. Populism 
thrives on the ability to create an “enemy.” In this case, that enemy would be the establishment 
and politicians that usurp power from the people. However, if Proposition 2 becomes associated 
with Democratic establishment politics, it no longer motivates those who identify as populists to 
vote for it.  
 These voters may also see Proposition 2 as pro-establishment in that it enables state 
legislators to continue to influence the redistricting process under the guise of giving the power 
back to the people. While the commission is nonpartisan based on its final makeup, it still has 
members that identify with the two major parties. There is also ambiguity as to how to ensure 
people are accurately reporting their partisan identification. Further, State House and Senate 
leadership, as well as partisan leadership in each chamber, can strike applicants from the final 
pool from which commission members are randomly chosen (Beggin). The critical difference is, 
unlike state legislators, voters then have no power to remove them if they object to their actions. 
These voters may have voted against Proposition 2 because, as a policy that does not go far 
enough, its passage could lead to complacency and a lack of motivation to further correct the 
process. This seems less likely, as results throughout this paper suggest that voters had limited 
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information on the measure (and thus its complexities), but it is still worth considering and 
examining in future research. 
Finally, the results may also be explained by the measure populism used in this chapter. This 
is not to say that the vote share for populist candidates cannot be used as a valid measure of 
populism. Just as the vote share for or against Proposition 2 reveals information about voters’ 
opinions and beliefs, so do the votes for populist candidates. However, voters may not have 
voted for one candidate or the other solely because of a populist ideology. While the first 
measure used to evaluate H1 suggests this is more likely to be the case because it would 
transcend partisanship, the latter two measures dilute to some extent the effect of populist 
ideology. Once again, the time and scope of this thesis is limited, so it was not possible to 
conduct a survey in these precincts of interest focused on gathering data on populist beliefs. This 
would provide a more precise measure of populism, as it could directly evaluate voters’ levels of 
trust in government and resentment of establishment politics. It could also reveal if these voters 
voted for Obama and/or Trump due of these reasons. This is another area in which future 
research would be valuable.  
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Conclusion & Implications for Future 
Research 
 
The analyses in this paper have offered different conclusions about each of the factors 
hypothesized to play a role in public opinion on redistricting reform. As is the case with most 
political issues, partisan cues do seem to be the primary determinant of people’s opinions. 
Although causation cannot be proven directly from this thesis, there is a strong correlation, and 
the majority of precincts with a solid partisan identification voted as predicted on Proposition 2. 
However, this effect was much stronger for Democrats than Republicans. Only one Democratic 
precinct deviated from the expected vote in favor or Proposition 2, while well over half of 
Republican precincts did not vote as expected on Proposition 2. While some of this may be due 
to influences such as values of fairness and electoral integrity being indiscernible from the effect 
of partisan cues for Democratic voters (but would involve voting in opposition to partisan cues 
for Republican voters), it nevertheless appears that partisan cues mattered. Partisan cues offer an 
informational shortcut for voters on an issue many know little about, and thus, people voted in 
accordance with these cues. 
Electoral self-interest did not appear to play significant role in people’s votes on Proposition 
2. Acting in self-interest requires the information to evaluate each outcome, but if Americans are 
largely uninformed on redistricting issues, it is unlikely that a large number of voters could factor 
this into their vote. Instead, most of the voters with the relevant information are political elites, 
who adhere much more closely to belief constraints and are more likely to vote in self-interest. 
This is still consistent with the findings of Bowler, Donavan, and Karp, as their results were 
based on responses from politicians. Symbolic considerations, such as partisan cues or concerns 
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about the broader electoral system such as fairness and integrity, are far more likely to influence 
a person’s opinion on redistricting reform than electoral self-interest. 
Finally, the results of populist ideals as an explanation for Republican votes against 
Proposition 2 were mixed. Using the highest threshold for classifying a precinct as populist 
(flipping from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016) revealed that populism played a small role. 
Using a lower threshold of a greater than 50% vote share for Obama and Trump across the two 
elections indicated that populism played a large role. The regression analysis suggested that there 
may even be a negative correlation between the vote share for the two populist candidates and 
the vote share in support of Proposition 2. Findings from Converse and Zaller show that, in 
general, Americans lack ideological consistency, and that is even more likely to be true for an 
issue that Americans have very little information about. This could serve to explain why populist 
ideals ultimately may not play a significant role in people’s opinions on redistricting reform. It is 
also possible that, despite my own inclinations, populist voters may still have perceived 
Proposition 2 as pro-establishment, and thus voted against it. Finally, the measure of populism 
used in this chapter is limited to inferences based on vote choice, whereas a survey could analyze 
the influence of populist ideology much more closely. 
That being said, a survey would be a valuable direction in which to take future research on 
examining Michiganders’ opinion on Proposition 2. A survey could ask more targeted questions 
about populist ideology, information levels, frequency of exposure to messaging about 
Proposition 2, and ideals of fairness. This can then be compared with precinct data to more 
precisely determine how much of an influence each factor examined in this thesis (as well as a 
few others) had on each voter’s decision. This would also allow researchers to discern the effects 
of factors that may have affected Democratic voters’ opinions that may otherwise have been 
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indistinguishable from the effects of partisan cues in this paper.  
This research could also be enhanced by a focus on state-level data in future analyses. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, particularly as it pertains to electoral competitiveness, the effects of 
state-level elections are much more easily observed. A focus on electoral competitiveness on a 
federal level would fail to account for any vote choices made in accordance with perceptions of 
competitiveness on a state level. 
Ultimately, while this thesis contributes to the literature on public opinion on redistricting 
reform by offering precinct data analysis to study a few large factors, future research using both 
precinct and survey data would provide an even more comprehensive understanding of what 
affects a person’s opinion on the issue. While I have found the results of this project to be 
illuminating, I also know there is so much more interesting and valuable research to be done to 















Appendix A: Electoral Competitiveness Regressions 
District 1: 
 





District 4:  
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District 9:  
 
District 10:  
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Appendix B: Democratic Margin of Victory Regressed onto Hypothetical Republican 
Vote Share Against Proposition 2 
For all districts: 
 
For Democratic districts: 
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Appendix C: Populism Vote Share Variable 
To illustrate how this variable is calculated, the election results from Alcona County, Alcona 
Township, Precinct 1 will be used.  
Candidate (Year) Votes 
Obama (2012) 254 
Romney (2012) 455 
Hoefling (2012) 0 
White (2012) 0 
Alexander (2012) 0 
Johnson (2012) 0 
Anderson (2012) 2 
Stein (2012) 4 
Goode (2012) 1 
Hoefling (2016) 0 
Maturen (2016) 0 
Moorehead (2016) 0 
McMullin (2016) 0 
Kotlikoff (2016) 0 
Hartnell (2016)  0 
Fox (2016) 0 
Stein (2016) 2 
Soltysik (2016) 0 
Castle (2016) 4 
Johnson (2016) 13 
Trump (2016) 500 
Clinton (2016) 199 
 
The Formula used is as follows:  
(Trump Votes + Obama Votes) / (Total Votes 2012 + Total Votes 2016) 
Therefore, for this precinct, the variable would be calculated as follows: 
(500 + 254) / (716 + 718)  
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